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Abstract 
This article explores the statutory underpinnings and corporate 
governance perspectives of investments by pension funds in Botswana. 
Specifically, the article evaluates the scope of the Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions Regulatory Authority Act (NBFIRA Act); Pension and Provident 
Funds Act (PPFA) and attendant delegated legislation in the context of 
investment considerations by pension funds. It examines the extent to which 
the country’s corporate governance terrain and laws regulating investments 
by pension funds embrace the concept of good corporate governance. The 
enquiry is motivated by the critical role played by effective corporate 
governance in a company’s corporate strategy, endeavour for longevity and 
its role as a good corporate citizen. Thus it becomes critical to investigate the 
legal framework and corporate governance perspectives of pension funds, a 
critical sector in the economy of Botswana. The article finds that the 
Botswana’s statutory infrastructure and corporate governance environment 
fail to create an effective platform which would incorporate and inculcate a 
culture of good corporate governance as pension funds deliberate on how to 
invest the billions of Pula entrusted to them as fiduciaries. Defaulting to 
adopt a cogent and forceful re-examination of the relevant law and good 
governance is disaster in waiting which the findings of this article strive to 
forestall. 
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Introduction 
The article explores statutory and corporate governance factors in 
investments decisions of pension funds in Botswana. It examines NBFIRA 
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Act, the PPFA, subsidiary legislation and investment paradigms of pension 
funds in the country in search of good corporate governance practices. The 
aim is to interrogate whether, as regards investments, this critical sector in 
the economy of the country is enveloped by effective corporate governance 
principles and a robust legal architecture. We contend that the sector is 
critical in two ways. Firstly, in 2013, the total membership of the ninety-five 
stand-alone pension funds licensed by NBFIRA stood at 166,500 and 
secondly, investment assets of these funds amounted to P47.4 billion 
(NBFIRA, 2013). The need to ensure that investments on behalf of the 
members is made prudently and with an eye on good corporate governance is 
driven by the fact Pension Funds in the country are allowed to invest a 
maximum of 70% of their assets offshore (NBFIRA, 2013). It is therefore 
salient that investment in various institutions around the world and in the 
country should be underpinned by good governance considerations so as to 
avert a crisis in the country’s principal social security system.  
 Changes in the financial environment are a major threat to pension 
funds in that they are highly risk centred organizations that are sensitive to 
the changes in financial markets. The 2007/2008 financial crises affected 
pension funds significantly because of their investments in the capital 
markets (Franzen, 2010).  
Fiduciary duties of pension schemes put them in the pressure of high 
valuation of return on investment in making investment decisions. The 
temptation of a high and quick return on investment, pushed by performance-
based remuneration of executives may lead to relegating good corporate 
governance considerations to the background. Focus on pension fund’s short-
term investments undermines ‘‘intergenerational wealth maximization…and 
can create market volatility and undermine sustainable wealth’ (Hawley, 
Johnson & Waitzer, 2011:7).  
The investigation adopts an interpretivist philosophy because it is 
based on what is depicted by the statutory law which regulates pension 
funds. Our enquiry adopts a qualitative research method. Krauss (2005) 
argues that many qualitative researchers are of the view that a problem is 
well grasped when its examined in its context and for this to happen, the 
researcher is immersed in the subject of his study.The approach is inductive 
in which theory is built from observation of reality which enables general 
conclusions to be made from certain instances (Collis & Hussey,2009). 
  
An Overview of Corporate Governance and Pension Funds 
The OECD (2004: 23) report defines corporate governance as the 
‘rules and practices that govern the relationship between the managers and 
shareholders of corporations, as well as stakeholders like employees and 
creditors’. Kaufman (1999) argues that there is ample empirical evidence of 
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a causal link between good governance and better development outcomes. 
Globally, corporate governance reforms have essentially been triggered by 
scandals in corporations (Afsharipour, 2009).  
Corporate governance goes beyond rules and regulations governing a 
company anchored merely on economic agenda of a company. Social and 
environmental considerations should also be integrated in a company’s 
formulation of strategy. On this approach, South Africa’s King III Report ( 
Institute of Directors,2009:11) states that: 
The proliferation of initiatives, tools and guidelines on 
sustainability is evidence of the growing awareness of sustainability 
issues. Because the company is so integral to society, it is considered 
as much a citizen of a country as is a natural person who has 
citizenship. It is expected that the company will be and will be seen to 
be a responsible citizen. This involves social, environmental and 
economic issues – the triple context in which companies in fact 
operate. Boards should no longer make decisions based only on the 
needs of the present because this may compromise the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
It is on the foregoing triple-bottom line philosophy that pension 
funds’ investments law and governance in Botswana are examined. Olaboda 
(2012) describes pension funds as a pool of resources in which people trust 
their possessions, money or assets with a view to having enough to support 
their needs after retirement. To NBFIRA (2013), pension funds exist so as to 
protect members’ investments so that they can retire with dignity which can 
only be realised if there are safeguards to protect their savings. This view has 
motivated the enquiry in this paper because without a robust governance and 
statutory mechanism, the very aim of pension funds would be wholly 
undermined.  
It is for the above reason that members’ resources should be invested 
by their fiduciaries bearing in mind the state of corporate governance in 
organisations where investments are made. We argue that the central role of 
a fiduciary is not necessarily to operate within a particular legal framework 
or policy but to adopt an approach which in the long term ensures that the 
interests of the principal are cushioned against caving-in. Our contention is 
that there is no better approach than incorporating good corporate 
governance into the process and decision of investing members’ resources by 
pension funds.  
 Richardson (2009) explains the fiduciary as a person with the 
character of trustee and being charged to mainly act in the benefit of another 
with respect to property or affairs. Our submission is that investments by 
trustees or fiduciaries should embrace social, ethical and environmental 
factors as opposed to merely taking into account the conservative or 
European Scientific Journal   July  2014  edition vol.10, No.19   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
196 
conventional trajectory of focusing on the economic dimension of their 
investments. We are therefore proposing for Botswana pension funds what 
Sandberg (2010) refers to as Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) also 
called Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG). 
 Undoubtedly, economic or financial elements of investing by 
institutional investors and in our case pension funds cannot be treated lightly.  
However, our view is that this central factor and social and ESG concerns 
should be mutually reinforcing so as to intensely safeguard the long term 
investments of the principals. We further contend that if pension funds and 
other institutional investors who are the main players in financial markets 
(Sandberg, 2010) do not adopt the suggested approach, then some of the 
objectives of sustainable development and the United Nation’s Millennium 
Development  Goals (MDGs), values and principles will not be achieved 
especially in a developing country like Botswana. These include respect for 
nature, protecting our common environment and promotion of human rights 
and good governance (UN Millennium Declaration, 2000). This is in 
agreement with the United Nations Environment Programme’s ‘Freshfields 
Report’ (UNEP, 2005) on responsible investment by institutional investors 
of which pension funds are unarguably key leaders.  
It is by adopting this approach that meaningful and sustainable 
investments will be realised. The ‘Freshfield’s Report (UNEP, 2005:3) notes 
that: 
In our business, the investment business, ethical conduct 
extends beyond not breaking the law to properly interpreting what is 
in the best interests of the savers who are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the institutional pools of money we are engaged to oversee or 
manage. This is where the interesting questions concerning fiduciary 
responsibility come to the fore: are the best interests of savers only to 
be defined as their financial interest? If so in respect to which 
horizon? Are not the social and environmental interests of savers 
also to be taken into account? Indeed, many people wonder what 
good an extra per cent or three of patrimony are worth if the society 
in which they are to enjoy retirement and in which their descendents 
will live deteriorates. Quality of life and quality of the environment 
are worth something, even if not, or particularly because, they are 
not reducible to financial percentages. 
Some scholars are also of this view. Anthony and Mustafa (2010) 
cited by Emmanuel and Umar (2011) explain that decision making of 
investment choices should be more than anchored on arithmetic view of 
expected returns on various risk investments but more on factors affecting 
political, economic and social means. Good governance is increasingly vital 
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for the national welfare in the global financial markets (Clark & Urvin, 
2009).  
Girdwood (2013) notes that a better understanding by pension funds 
fiduciaries of climate change and its negative impact on the global business 
environment will prompt fiduciaries to incorporate ESG considerations in 
their investment decisions. This is a relatively new concept and we hope that 
our paper will trigger debates and hopefully reform the status quo on 
investments by pension funds in Botswana. We now turn to the statutory 
provisions on pension funds’ investment in Botswana. 
 
The Statutory Tone of Pension Funds’ Investments in Botswana 
The supervisory authority of pension funds is vested in the Registrar 
of Pension and Provident Funds by section 11 of the Pension and Provident 
Funds Act (PPFA), 1987. In terms of section 11 of this Act, the functions 
and duties of the Registrar (which section 2 of the Act refers to as the Non-
Bank Financial Regulatory Authority), shall, to quote verbatim, include: 
a. the licence and superintendence of the conduct of pensions and 
provident funds; 
b. the formulation and enforcement of standards in the conduct of the 
business of pensions and provident funds with which the management 
of such funds must comply; 
c. the recommendation to the Minister to make regulations for the 
carrying out of Government policies relating to the funds; 
d. such other functions as are assigned to the Registrar by this Act or 
regulations made thereunder or such other duties as the Minister may 
assign to him. 
It is therefore apparent from the PPFA perspective that its aim is not 
to vest the Registrar with jurisdiction to question or determine whether good 
governance considerations as elucidated above are the linchpin of pension 
funds’ investments decisions.  It can be argued that on a literal interpretation 
of the above provision, the Registrar would be acting ultra vires were he to 
require pension and provident funds to report on good governance 
considerations in their investment decisions, much as that would be the 
pivotal question to ask from a sustainability and ESG perspective.  
It is worth noting that under the common law of Botswana, and as 
held by the High Court in the case of Aubrey J Molatlhwe & Others v The 
Diocese of the Church of the Province of Central Africa 1 , a literal 
interpretation of statutes is the preferred approach so as to restrain judicial 
discretion in statutory interpretation. The expressions  ‘conduct of pensions’ 
                                                          
1 Aubrey J Molatlhwe & Others v The Diocese of the Church of the Province of Central 
Africa [2008] 3 BLR 317. 
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and ‘standards in the conduct of business’ as captured in section 2 above 
cannot be construed to mean contemporary corporate governance, especially 
ESG factors, without serious and justified accusations of usurpation of the 
role of the legislature by the Registrar. 
The overarching legislation governing pension funds in Botswana is 
the NBFIRA Act 2 2007. The Act is an integral part of the country’s 
commendable initiative of reforming the legal and regulatory mechanisms of 
its financial sector, what Bojosi (2012) calls a ‘metamorphosis.’ While the 
banking sector is under the regulation of the Bank of Botswana (the Central 
Bank), there was before the NBFIRA Act’s promulgation a major legal and 
regulatory lacuna in the regulation of non-banking institutions. Among 
others, the NBFIRA Act’s main aim is to safeguard the stability, fairness and 
efficiency of the Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIA, 2014).  
In particular, there was a public outcry over misdeeds of the so called 
‘loan sharks’ (Bojosi, 2012) who exploited the skeletal financial knowledge 
of their customers. The preamble of the NBFIRA Act posits that the Act 
enhances soundness of non-bank financial institutions; high standards of 
conduct of business; the stability of the non-bank financial system; and 
reducing and deterring financial crime. Cleary, these objectives apply to 
pension funds all which fall within the statutory powers of Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (‘the authority) pursuant to 
section 2 of the NBFIRA Act. 
The authority is established under section 8 of the NBFIRA Act. The 
said section states the principal objects of the authority as: 
a. safety and soundness of non-bank financial institutions; 
b. highest standards of conduct of business by non-bank financial 
institutions; 
c. fairness, efficiency and orderliness of the non-bank financial 
institutions; 
d. fairness, efficiency and orderliness of the non-bank financial sector; 
e. stability of the financial system, and 
f. reduction and deterrence of financial crime. 
While the authority may be critiqued on its institutional structure with 
a view to reforming it, the focus of this article is on its mandate as pertains to 
investment decisions by non-bank financial institutions from a corporate 
governance approach as submitted in part 2 above. As with the PPFA, the 
NBFIRA Act is not categorical that pension funds should take on board the 
now cutting-edge considerations of corporate governance. It is when such 
considerations fall within the statutory powers of the authority that 
significant assurance of longevity of pension funds would become 
pronounced and near indisputable. 
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As is common with many enabling legislation like the NBFIRA Act, 
power may be delegated to a person or entity for a steady operationalisation 
of the objectives of the Act. Thus section 50(1) of the NBFIRA Act provides 
delegated power to the authority to make rules for the prudentially regulated 
non-bank financial institutions in particular their management and conduct of 
business. In exercise of the foregoing power, the authority has established 10 
Prudential Financial Rules (PFR) on retirement funds. The aim is to 
minimise or prevent financial risks in this sector (NBFIRA, 2013). Our focus 
is on PFR2 and PFR 10.  
PFR 2 provides direction on the contents of a fund’s investment 
strategy. In so far as is relevant to our investigation, PFR2 states that the 
fund’s investment strategy shall take into account the need to diversify the 
assets of the fund; the risks to which the assets and liabilities of the fund will 
be exposed and that investment managers or the board itself is expected to 
consult experts with ample skills, experience and knowledge to advice on a 
proper investment strategy unless the board includes such members to 
perform those functions. NBFIRA Act and rules have therefore not embraced 
the current corporate governance philosophy as one of the central factors to 
be taken into account in the formulation of investment strategy for pension 
funds.  
To consolidate our view that the entire NBFIRA Act and delegated 
legislation as in the PFR rules are not intended to prescribe central tenets of 
ESG, PFR 10 which stipulates the code of conduct of the Board of Trustees, 
the entity in a pension fund entrusted with the management of the fund, is 
silent on the mainstream corporate governance issues.  PFR 10 mainly 
provides for ethical conduct of trustees especially to act with honesty, in 
good faith and with the highest standard of care, diligence and skill; 
managing conflicts of interest; acting with impartiality and not to disclose or 
make use of confidential information obtained by virtue of their office for the 
advantage of themselves or anyone else.  Frenzen (2010) and Richardson 
(2009) concur that these duties of a pension fund’s fiduciary ensure that 
loyalty to the beneficiary is maintained and that the fiduciary acts in the best 
interests of the member. Regarding investments PFR 10 states that trustees 
should identify and manage risk related to the fund pursuant to a risk 
management policy and to review that policy at least once every 2 years. 
 
Fiduciary Duties of Trustees: Enlarging the Scope 
Because of the failure by the statutory law of Botswana to integrate 
ESG considerations in investment decisions by pension funds, it would then 
appear that only trustees of pension funds can decide to invest their 
members’ funds in companies with a good culture and record of corporate 
governance. That becomes a discretionary exercise of power as opposed to a 
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legal obligation. The problem is that taking into account ESG factors might 
be interpreted by critics as a departure from the historical and legal duties of 
a fiduciary which deem non-financial issues as moral and religious questions 
rather than strategic concerns (Hoepner, Rezec & Siegl, 2011). This is more 
so in a common law country like Botswana which generally adopts a literal 
approach to statutory interpretation as seen in the High Court decision in the 
case of Molathlwe. It is this narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty which 
prevents fiduciaries from looking beyond the narrow view of short term 
economic gains for members who are the beneficiaries of these funds 
(Waitzer & Sarro, 2013). 
 Some common law countries are boldly moving from the 
conservative understanding of the role of a fiduciary as regards trustees of 
pension funds. In Canada, the role of trustees of pension funds as fiduciaries 
is evolving towards incorporating ESG considerations (Waitzer & Sarro, 
2012). In that country, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) 
Policy on Responsible Investing requires that social and environmental 
factors be taken into account when making investments (Waitzer & Sarro, 
2012; CPPIB, 2014). Clearly, this is a commendable approach which pension 
funds and their trustees in Botswana should adopt because of the myriad 
benefits derived from integrating ESG considerations when making 
investments.  
In South Africa, statutory reforms made in 2011 enlarged the scope 
of fiduciaries of pension funds so as to contribute towards mitigating the 
effects of global corporate scandals. Regulation 28 issued under the Pension 
Funds Act, 1956 now adopts the principle of prudent investing. The shift was 
necessitated by what the Government in the Explanatory Memorandum of 
2010 called ‘recent financial crisis’ (National Treasury, 2010). The preamble 
to the regulation provides that: 
A fund has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of its 
members whose benefits depend on the responsible management of 
fund assets. This duty supports the adoption of a responsible 
investment approach to deploying capital into markets that will earn 
adequate risk adjusted returns suitable for the fund’s specific member 
profile, liquidity needs and liabilities. Prudent investing should give 
appropriate consideration to any factor which may materially affect 
the sustainable long-term performance of a fund’s assets, including 
factors of an environmental, social and governance character. This 
concept applies across all assets and categories of assets and should 
promote the interests of a fund in a stable and transparent 
environment. 
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Conclusion 
This article has examined statutory law and corporate governance 
dynamics of investments decisions of pension funds in Botswana. It has been 
seen that the relevant legislation namely the Pension and Provident Funds 
Act, the NBFIRA Act and delegated legislation in force do not encompass 
ESG factors as key in investment decision-making by pension funds’ trustees 
who are members’ fiduciaries. In addition, the common law scope of the 
duties of a fiduciary do not extend to taking into account non-financial 
matters as they are viewed by critics as religious or moral considerations. It 
has been argued that a literal interpretation of statutes in Botswana would 
most probably deter the inclusion of ESG factors in investments by pension 
funds.  
The position in Botswana does not augur well for intergenerational 
sustainability of pension funds neither does it promote the international 
community’s clamour for protection of the environment, social justice and 
human rights. On investments by pension funds, it is proposed that the 
NBFIRA Act, the Pension and Provident Funds Act and delegated legislation 
made thereunder should integrate ESG elements, an emerging trend which 
has expanded the scope of fiduciaries in Canada and South Africa which are 
common law jurisdictions like Botswana. 
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